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The Science Court:
Reminiscence and Retrospective
Allan Mazur*
Introduction
The very name "science court" got us into trouble nearly from the
start, suggesting a return to Galileo's time when established authority
could dictate that the sun revolved around the earth. Our intent was just
the opposite, to make as objective as possible the scientific basis for
controversial public policy by resolving technical disputes between
biased experts. In the end, the science court itself became so
controversial that it had no chance of success. Like a sky rocket, it got a
lot of attention as it ascended but just as quickly fell downward to crash
and burn.
Looking back, the post-Watergate presidency of Gerald Ford was a
contentious time with debates in all arenas flaring one month and fading
a short time later. Investigative journalism was still enjoying its greatest
success, and many young practitioners in other fields including the
natural and social sciences adopted the same combative stance, often as
champions of little people at odds with the big interests. A good model
for those times is the battle of Love Canal, pitting the working class
residents of that community against the chemical industry; 1 or the
citizens of Cambridge, Massachusetts, fighting a proposed university
laboratory for recombinant DNA research. 2 At that time, perhaps the
must visible involvement of scientists in a public controversy was the
battle of New York Times petitions, listing in one day's advertisement
hundreds of scientists who opposed nuclear power and on another day
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hundreds in favor. 3 To the public (including me), technical expertise
seemed no more reliable than psychiatric witnesses in a courtroom
4
whose "scientific objectivity" often has the appearance of a chimera.
Reminiscence
My first knowledge of Arthur Kantrowitz came from Professor
Hans Bethe of Cornell University during our correspondence about
scientific disputes surrounding nuclear power. I had sent Bethe my
recently published analysis comparing the controversies over nuclear
power and fluoridation. 5 These technical disputes are confusing, in
part because of rhetorical devices used by the contending experts that
obscure rather than clarify, and in part because the experts talk past each
other. A calm analysis of opposing views - which almost never occurs
- could clear much of this verbal thicket, but there would remain points
of ambiguity upon which experts may legitimately disagree, and where
it cannot be said that one is "right" and the other "wrong."
In order to clarify such disputes for the sake of policy makers, I
6
proposed a procedure:
to allow the disagreeing experts to confront each other as
adversaries before a panel of judges. These judges, who are
not personally involved with either side, are presumably able
to make a fairly objective, dispassionate decision on the
merits of the argument. It is important to emphasize that the
judges would not make a decision of policy such as whether
or not to accept x cases of cancer for y amount of
electricity. Such scientific and technological judges have no
special wisdom or moral prerogative to decide how many
cancers their society should accept. They might, however,
be particularly qualified to make a purely technical scientific
decision, such as whether or not x cases of cancer might
occur in a population receiving y amount of radiation. The
judges must be scientifically and technically competent,
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though they need not be specialists in the field of the
adversaries. As the adversaries confronted each other,
attacking and rebutting, points of disagreement would
become clear. The natural process of polarization might even
be helpful here since the opposing positions, pushed to their
extremes, would be clearly contrasted. The judges might
then be able to decide if either or both adversaries were
wrong, or if the differences between them were legitimate,
resting on points of irreducible ambiguity. In the latter case,
they might then decide on the feasibility of reducing the
ambiguity through further research. The judges' report
would constitute part of the counsel given to policy-makers.
If the report said that the scientific picture was inconclusive,
then the policy-makers would have to proceed on that basis.
In 1974, with my colleague at Syracuse University, W. Henry
Lambright, I circulated a modest proposal to test and evaluate this
procedure. Following Bethe's suggestion, I contacted Kantrowitz and
learned that he had made a similar proposal years earlier, first in
7
testimony to Congress and then in an article published in SCIENCE.
Adopting Professor Field's literary device in his introduction to this
issue, I could not convince a patent attorney that my "social invention"
was importantly different from Kantrowitz's, and his has clear priority.
The difference in our views lies more in fervor than substance, with
Kantrowitz always seeming to me more certain of the workability and
desirability of the science court - whether as a process or an institution
than I ever was. In any case, thereafter Kantrowitz incorporated my
work into his own proposal 8 and included me in the rapidly
developing activities.
The most effective and best connected entrepreneur whom I have
personally known, Kantrowitz got the Ford Administration to set up a
task force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances
in Science and Technology with the specific aim of exploring the
workability of a science court process. He arranged for my appointment
7 Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposalfor an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
ScIENCE 763 (1967).
8 See e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63
AMERICAN ScmS 505 (1975).
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to the Task Force; I was the only member whom none of the other
members had heard of.
Kantrowitz never cared for the name "science court," usually calling
his invention the "Institution for Scientific Judgement," a label so
cumbersome that it demanded a nickname. The first person to oblige, as
far as I know, was science journalist Daniel Greenberg in a snide article
9
that began:
With over a score of influential supporters in and out of
government, plans are going ahead in Washington to try out
the 'science court' proposal that Arthur Kantrowitz...has
been plugging for over a decade.
The New York Times quickly picked up the term and fleshed it out with
a cartoon of laboratory instruments dressed in judges' robes. 10 Critics
soon wrote of the "supreme court" of science, an image that ensured
active debate and the attention of the news media.
In the meantime, the Task Force settled on a model for the court that
was close to the early ones we had proposed but had a couple of added
features. The most important addition, I think, was to initially obtain
from the scientific adversaries not only the "facts" upon which they
disagreed and intended to debate, but also those relevant facts that both
sides accepted as correct. Thus, a useful output from the procedure,
even before any debate in front of the judges, was a relevant list of
consensually-accepted scientific statements. Most of the other additions
were procedures intended to insure the fairness and smooth working of
the process.
Kantrowitz got Philip Abelson, then editor of SCIENCE, to publish
as an article (no need for peer review) the "interim report" of the Task
Force, drafted mostly by him and me, that argued the case for the
science court, proposed an experiment to evaluate the idea and
announced a colloquium the next month in Leesburg, Virginia, to
discuss the proposal further. 11 This prominent display in SCIENCE was
9
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a climax to the journalistic buildup and promised that the Leesburg
meeting would be well attended.
Leesburg was a big event, sponsored by the Commerce Department,
the National Science Foundation, and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and attracting some 250 scientists, engineers,
lawyers, administrators, and reporters. For me, lunching at a small table
with a Nobel laureate, the President's science advisor, and Margaret
Mead was testosterone inducing. Mead had come as the most celebrated
critic of the science court. I watched her and Kantrowitz - two senior
diplomats of science - charming one another toward their respective
points of view. Kantrowitz prevailed, and Mead ended up endorsing the
12
trial.
Just as Kantrowitz had hoped, Leesburg gave the project a big
boost, and, by January, 1977, the leaders of the nation's major
scientific societies had endorsed the experiment. 13 But within days,
Jimmy Carter replaced Gerald Ford as president, and the new White
House science agenda, while not hostile to the science court, had other
priorities. Plans for a grand experiment quickly faded away.
Retrospective
From the outset I was a strong proponent of an experimental
evaluation of the science court process, but agnostic about the value of
an institutionalized court. Lacking the grand experiment, I have not
changed my views much, but over the years we have run small trials
that address some of the questions that have been raised.
For example, at Syracuse University I acted as the referee in the
initial phases of a science court held to study possible hazards from 60
Hertz electromagnetic fields associated with high-voltage transmission
lines. 14 This was a highly contentious issue in New York State at that
12 Phillip Boffey, Experiment Planned to Test Feasibilityof a "Science Court,"
193 SCIENCE 129 (1976); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COLLOQUIUM ON THE SCIENCE COURT (1977).
13 John Noble Wilford, Wilford, 28 LeadersEndorse Science Court Test, The New

York Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at L28.
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time, and, on contacting the major scientific spokesmen for the
opposing sides, I learned that, while they had appeared as witnesses in
the same regulatory hearings, they had never communicated directly
with one another over their disagreements.
Drs. Robert Becker and Andrew Marino, then at the Veteran's
Administration Hospital in Syracuse, were the anti-line scientists
warning of a hazard from its fields. They produced for me a list of their
factual claims, that I sent to their pro-line adversaries who responded
with criticisms that the claims were vague and untestable. Becker and
Marino revised their list in response to these criticisms, and I again sent
it to the pro-line scientists, who generally found the revision much
improved as a statement of facts in dispute. I ended the "experiment" at
this point, despite suggestions for further refinement from the pro-line
side, because it was already clear that the factual issues could be suitably
isolated.
Kantrowitz has administered a few science-court-like hearings, at
the University of California, Berkeley, and at Dartmouth, involving
health effects from the leaked chemicals at Love Canal, and the
feasibility of the "Star Wars" missile defense system. 15 Each of these
experiments worked well in a university setting. There was no attempt
to follow rigorous formal procedure as in a court of law. The norms of
behavior were those of a college seminar, with the few added
constraints required by the science court such as disallowing policy
considerations to enter the discussion. Audiences always included
students, professors and members of the public, most of whom
apparently regarded the exercise as a valuable educational experience.
Although lacking the rigor of the trials we had initially hoped for, these
experiences still provide useful lessons.
The first lesson is that, contrary to the fears of critics, we never had
a serious problem in separating questions of scientific fact from
questions of policy preference. It puzzles me that this complaint is still
raised today, in this journal, since I thought we had complied enough
15 Roger Masters & Arthur Kantrowitz, Scientific Adversary Procedures:The SDI'

Experiments at Dartmouth, in TECHNOLOGY AND POLMCs 278 (Michael Kraft and
Norman Vig eds. 1988).

Mazur: Reminiscence and Retrospective 167

demonstrations to put it to rest. As a practical matter, the isolation of
scientific questions is easy, despite philosophical arguments to the
contrary. I claim this objection is a red herring, the gut response of
those who deny that science is more objective than any other road to
knowledge.
To avoid unnecessary argument, let me be very clear on what I
mean. Granted that all human discourse involves evaluation and is
"socially constructed" to some degree; that is not at issue. The pertinent
concern is that people who favor one social policy often come up with
different scientific "facts" than those who favor a contrary policy. It is
these kinds of blatant policy values, and their effects on knowledge
claims, that are to be removed from consideration. Values that are
shared by all contending interest groups, or ones too subtle to affect
practical decisions, may be intertwined in the statements of fact without
causing a problem. 16 As a practical matter, it was always feasible to
ask factual questions - e.g.: "Did the chemicals that leaked from Love
Canal cause morbidity in the neighboring population?" - apart from
one's position about what should be done for the people living there or
to the chemical industry.
A second lesson is that, although experts on opposing sides
typically misconstrue one another's position, when brought together
they have discovered less factual disagreement than they (or anyone
else) thought. To appreciate the impact of the science-court-like
exchange of statements regarding high-voltage transmission lines, one
must be aware that the opposing sides had virtually no direct contact
during their three-year involvement in the controversy, and they never
before had been called upon to compare their scientific positions on a
point-by-point basis. One side found that it has misperceived the
position of the other side. Some disagreements were easily resolved by
rewording statements to be less extreme or better specified. By the end
of our trials, there remained relatively few scientific questions upon
which the adversaries disagreed. The most useful output from our
procedures has typically been the list of relevant factual statements upon
16 See Allan Mazur, Science Courts, 15 MINERVA 1 (1977) or Mazur, supra
note 3, for detailed discussions of this issue.
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which the adversaries agree and the smaller list of factual statements
upon which they still disagree.
A third lesson is that the few scientific claims upon which
adversaries continued to disagree have always been unresolvable with
the present state of knowledge, usually because suitable data were
lacking. This has always become apparent to us during the process, and
I assume that judges evaluating such cases would realize it too. But if
science court judges would inevitably be confronted by questions that
they cannot answer for lack of data, so that their reports would
predictably read, "not answerable with the current state of knowledge,"
then what function is served by the judges? This reasoning leads me to a
surprising conclusion: There is no needfor a panel ofjudges to decide
which adversary is correct because, most likely, neither adversary will
be clearly correct. If I were reformulating the science court proposal
today, I would leave out the judges, making it in effect a mediation
process. This ought to satisfy critics who fear that the court would
become authoritarian. It is enough for the adversaries, with the aid of a
referee, to work out in clear language the relevant scientific points upon
which they do and do not agree. That, I suggest, would be useful
information for policy makers, journalists and the interested public.
A fourth lesson: In all cases in which a science-court-like procedure
was used, one side always wanted to participate and one side did not;
the latter had to be prodded into cooperation. Invariably, the side that
was losing the policy fight wanted to participate, apparently because
they saw it as politically advantageous to do so. Conversely, the side
then winning the policy fight was typically reluctant to enter a science
court, apparently figuring that participation could not improve - and
might erode - its favorable position. 17 The lesson here, I think, is that
once these controversial technical issues reach the public policy arena,
17 In a related vein, see Phillip Sperber, Overlooked Negotiating Tools, 20 LES
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81 (1985). In addressing the pros and cons of agreeing to alternatives

other than litigation for resolving a patent dispute, Sperber observes, at 81:
For instance, if patent validity or infringement is questionable, why
take a chance with an arbitration expert who will know exactly how
weak the patent is and how dubious infringement is? It makes sense to
take one's chances with a judge inexperienced in the technical and
legal aspects involved. [Emphasis added.]
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they are primarily political controversies and only secondarily (if that)
disputes over scientific knowledge.
Summary and Conclusions
We still do not know if a science court would work as intended, but
some lessons to date are encouraging: The separation of factual and
policy questions is practical. Two relevant outputs, a list of agreed upon
facts and a list of facts in dispute, are easily obtained and widely
perceived as useful. Probably the panel of judges, the focus of so much
past controversy, can be eliminated. The subordination of knowledge
goals to political goals, that we witness in these trials, emphasizes anew
the desirability of counteracting the biases of polarized experts. And
whatever else may or may not be accomplished, the educational value of
a science court seems substantial.
Should we then press ahead with the old science court proposal?
The basic problem addressed by the science court - providing good
scientific advice - remains as important as it was in the 1970's, but it
then seemed more pressing because challenges to technology were
usually raucous and chaotic, coming from the undisciplined grassroots
rather than established institutions. Protests often seemed to be voiced
by maverick scientists or frantic and arguably uninformed citizens, a
mix of media hype and hysteria. That has changed. In the past two
decades, several oppositional groups have matured into sophisticated
environmental lobby organizations, looking to the grassroots more for
fund raising than for marchers. They now form an influential,
Washington-based establishment in their own right, working more
cooperatively with the federal agencies and Congress than in strict
opposition to them. Today, national news media turn to respectable
groups, not to the mavericks, for information about technological
problems. Thus, the perception of undisciplined, raucous and chaotic
technical controversy has dissipated. My personal perception is that
technical controversies over social policy reach no better resolution than
they did in the 1970's. But today, because they seem more orderly and
under control, less need is perceived among policy analysts for a
solution as radical as a wholly new social institution, like the science
4 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 161 [Spring 1993]
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court. Given that the proposal made little headway in the 1970's, it
would make less today.
The present value of a science court lies right where we have located
it, in the university, where it fits easily into established tradition, rather
than as a grand new social institution. It can be carried out with
university resources for the benefit of students and faculty. In that
context it offers splendid educational value. It provides an opportunity
for research on scientific policy making. It is a convenient device for the
rational examination of specific scientific controversies. Let us promote
its use in the university but not try to push it beyond that arena at this
time.

